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TOURO LAW REVIEW
plaintiff prove actual malice on the part of the defendant. 68 In
deciding the defamation issue, the Cruz court cited Galella v.
Onassis.69 In Galella, the court held that the First Amendment
does not establish a wall of immunity which protects news
persons from any liability for their conduct while gathering
news.
70
Since under both New York and federal analysis the Cruz court
did not find that freedom of speech would act as an absolute
defense and since triable issues of fact existed, the defendants
motion for summary judgment was denied.
WESTCHESTER COUNTY
Glendora v. Kofalt71
(decided July 28, 1994)
Plaintiff alleged that her state constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech72 and freedom of expression 73 had been
violated when the defendant, Cable Systems Corporation, refused
to broadcast the plaintiffs program material. 74 The Supreme
Court, Westchester County, dismissed plaintiffs claims and held
that the defendant was not a state actor and the constitutional
guarantees complained about would merely "'protect the
individual against action by governmental authorities, not by
68. Cruz, N.Y. L.J., June 7, 1994, at 23.
69. 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that social needs may
warrant some intrusion of privacy, but the interference may be no greater than
that necessary).
70. Id. (stating that crimes and torts committed in news gathering are not
protected by the First Amendment).
71. 162 Misc. 2d 166, 616 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Suip. Ct. Westchester County
1994).
72. Id. at 168, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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private persons."' 75 Therefore the defendant's actions did not
violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights. 76 The court did,
however, grant the plaintiffs motion to compel broadcasting on
other grounds. 77
The controversy arose when the defendant agreed to broadcast
the plaintiffs programming material. The material contained
allegations of misconduct by a home improvement contractor in
multiple installments. 78 After broadcasting "a number of
75. Id. at 173, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (citation omitted). See N.Y. CONST.
art 1, § 8. This provision provides that: "Every citizen may freely speak, write
and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or of the press." Id.
76. Glendora, 162 Misc. 2d at 173, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
77. Id. The court upheld Executive Law § 829(3) and found that the
defendants had violated this law by exercising editorial control over
programming. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that state law, Executive Law § 829(3) was preempted. Id. at 170,
616 N.Y.S.2d at 141. The law at issue states, "No cable television company
may prohibit or limit any program or class or type of program presented over a
leased channel or any channel made available for public access or educational
purposes." N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 829(3) (McKinney 1982).
The court noted that § 531(e) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 "forbids the cable operator from exercising editorial control over its PEG
programming." Glendora, 162 Misc. 2d at 169, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
Because the New York statute "also fbrbids such editorial control," the court
did not find that the statutes created a conflict. Id. In the absence of allegations
that the program material was "obscene, sexually explicit, or that is solicits or
promotes unlawful conduct[,]" the defendant's action, by refusing to broadcast
the plaintiff's programming, constituted unlawful editorial control. Id. at 170,
616 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
The court, however, dismissed the plaintiff's negligence claim and stated that
the defendant's action was clearly intentional and granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Id. at 174, 616
N.Y.S.2d at 144. The plaintiff's defamation claim was dismissed because the
facts did not show and the complaint did not allege that the defendants engaged
in libel or slander. Id. The court similarly found that the facts did not support
that there was any "mental injury caused by the defendant's conduct" and.
granted the defendants motion to dismiss the claims of negligent infliction of
emotional disturbance, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
78. Id at 168, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
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installments," 79 the defendants unilaterally refused to broadcast
the remaining installments. 80 The plaintiff proceeded pro se, and
sought damages under the New York State Constitution alleging
that the defendant had violated her rights to freedom of speech
and press. 81Even though the court found that the plaintiff's actions were
collaterally estopped, it engaged in a brief analysis of the relevant
issues, including freedom of speech. The court noted that, "[it is
a firmly established principle of constitutional law that the state
and federal constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech protect
the individual against action by governmental authorities, not by
private persons." 82 An inquiry was made as to whether cable
casting could be considered a state activity, or whether the
company was acting under the color of state law. 83
The court held that although a cable company is viewed as a
public utility, its activities do not fall under the color of state
law. 84 In coming to its conclusion, the court relied on Montalvo
v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 85 a case in which the
plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to establish that the action of a
public utility constituted state activity. 86 The plaintiff in
Montalvo argued that factors such as Consolidated Edison's
"monopoly status within its franchise area, the high degree of
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 168-69, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 140-41.
82. Id. at 173, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
83. Id. at 173, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
84. Id. at 174, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
85. 92 A.D.2d 389, 460 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1st Dep't 1983), aff'd, 61
N.Y.2d 810, 462 N.E.2d 149, 473 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1984). The plaintiff in
Montalvo sought declaratory and injunctive relief in addition to compensatory
and punitive damages for "personal and economic injuries allegedly suffered as
a result of being deprived of utility service." Id. at 390-91, 460 N.Y.S.2d at
786. Justice Asch, dissenting in part, held that "it is not necessary to take even
such a leap in legal logic to reach the conclusion that the action by
Consolidated Edison in this case constitutes 'state action' and as a consequence
is in violation of the Constitution." Id. at 400, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 791 (Asch, J.,
dissenting).
86. Id. at 389, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
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state regulation," 87 and the fact that, "New York State has
delegated to Con Ed the traditional state function of dispute
resolution"88 predicated state action.89 The Glendora court
rejected these factors as indicative of state action.90 The court
similarly rejected the assertion that public utilities operate under
the color of state law. "Although a cable company is considered a
public utility this does not imbue any of the defendants with the
power or authority of the State." 91
In determining whether state action occurred, the Glendora
court examined the criteria utilized in Shad Alliance v. Smith
Haven Mall.92 The factors the court focused on included:
Mhe source of authority for the private action; whether the
State is so entwined with the regulation of the private conduct as
to constitute State activity; whether there is meaningful State
participation in the activity; and whether there has been a
87. Id. at 394, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
88. Id. at 395, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
89. Id. at 396, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
90. Id.
91. Glendora, 162 Misc. 2d at 166, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
92. 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985). The
plaintiffs alleged that Smith Haven Mall's policy to prohibit "all leafleting and
all types of political activities or gatherings" from its premises infringed their
First Amendment rights. Id. at 488, N.E.2d at 1212, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
The court held that "because the actions of the owner do not constitute the
state action necessary to trigger Federal constitutional protections," there was
no infingement. Id. at 500, 488 N.E.2d at 1213, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 101. In his
dissent, Chief Judge Wachtler cited PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980), where the court held that "California's recognition of a State
constitutional right to solicit signatures for petitions in shopping malls did not
infringe upon either the Federal property, due process or First Amendment
rights of mall owners." Shad, 66 N.Y.2d at 509, 488 N.E.2d at 1220, 498
N.Y.S.2d. at 108. Judge Wachtler stated that access to shopping malls is
essential to the preservation of free speech because they have replaced town
squares, which provided "inexpensive channels of communication." Id. at
512, 488 N.E.2d at 1221, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 109. He argued that because
shopping malls function in many communities as the only form of public
gathering, access to them is necessary to protect "one of our most cherished
liberties." Id. See John A. Ragosta, Free Speedi Access to Shopping Malls
Under State Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1
(1986).
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delegation of what has traditionally been a State function to a
private person. 93
In its analysis of these factors, the Shad court looked at the intent
of the drafters of the free speech provision. The court held that it
was clear that free speech had been "intended by its drafters to
serve as a check on governmental, not private conduct. ' 94 The
Glendora court also noted that the state's involvement in cable
casting consists of "a set of statutory and regulatory laws
specifying what the defendant cable cast operator is allowed to
do." 95 This involvement was deemed insufficient to label the
cable casting as governmental activity. 96
A public utility had been, however, previously considered a
state actor in a case where constitutional rights violations were
alleged. In Cahill v. Public Service Commission,97 the New York
Court of Appeals determined that a utility's action in,passing on
the cost of charitable contributions when setting rates for its
customers constituted impermissible government conduct. 98 The
Cahill court determined that coercion resulting from the state's
establishment of rates, which included an allowance for the
contributions, combined with the fact that the utility was a
93. Shad, 66 N.Y.2d at 505, 488 N.E.2d at 1217, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
94. Id. at 500, 488 N.E.2d at 123, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
95. Glendora, 162 Misc. 2d at 174, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
96. Id.
97. 69 N.Y.2d 265, 506 N.E.2d 187, 513 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1986).
98. Id. The court relied heavily upon Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209 (1977). The Cahill court explained that in Abood, the "plaintiffs,
nonunion teachers, challenged the validity of a union shop clause in the
collective bargaining agreement between their employer and the teachers'
union because dues they were compelled to pay were being used by the union
for legislative lobbying and for the support of political candidates." Cahill, 69
N.Y.2d at 270, 506 N.E.2d at 189, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 658. The Abood court
held that the Constitution requires that such expenditures be financed with
money of employees, "who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are
not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of
governmental employment." Id. at 271, 506 N.E.2d at 189, 513 N.Y.S.2d at
658 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected
the Abood decision in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974) and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). Cahill, 69 N.Y.2d at
272, 506 N.E.2d at 190, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
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monopoly which the customer had no choice but to utilize,
constituted impermissible government action. 99
The Glendora court addressed a federal constitutional issue
when it determined that Executive Law section 829(3) was
constitutional. 100 The court, deeming the statute content-
neutral, 10 1 subjected it to the O'BrienlWard balancing test.l102
This test asks whether the regulation "'furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.'" 10 3
The regulation is not required to be "'the least restrictive or least
intrusive means of doing so.' ' 104 These requirements would be
met if the "regulation promotes a substantial government interest
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." 105
The court found that the state's "intent to enhance and encourage
public interest in cable television," and its connected "prohibition
99. Cahill, 69 N.Y.2d at 272, 506 N.B.2d at 189, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
In a dissenting opinion, it was stated that "the State's regulatory involvement
in the cost pass-along... is an insufficient basis for finding that his rights
have been impaired by the actions of a governmental entity." Id. at 274, 506
N.E.2d at 191, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 660-61 (Titone, J., dissenting).
100. Glendora, 162 Misc. 2d at 172, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
101. Id.
102. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The court
held that because the government has a "substantial interest in assuring the
continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates," the statute at
issue is "an appropriately narrow means of protecting this interest," and
"because the non communicative impact of O'Brien's act of burning his
registration certificate frustrated the Government's interest," the defendant's
conviction was justified. Id. at 382; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (holding that a city's "sound-amplification guideline
is narrowly tailored to serve substantial and content-neutral governmental
interests" and is therefore "valid under the First Amendment as a reasonable
regulation of the place and manner of expression").
103. Glendora, 162 Misc. 2d at 170-71, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 141 (quoting
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
104. Id. at 171, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 142 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798).
105. Id. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (holding
that "the general exclusions of recipients of bar letters for a military open
house does not violate the First Amendment").
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of censorship... promotes a stated governmental interest in a
way that places no limits of specifications on content of the
programming." 106 Because the Executive Law survived the
O'Brien/Ward balancing test, the law was upheld and the
defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. 107
The Glendora court's decision concerning public utilities is in
alignment with the federal courts' treatment of similar cases. In
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 108 the United States
Supreme Court held that a privately owned and operated utility
company, though subject to "extensive state regulation," was not
acting under the color of state law.109 The Court also engaged in
an analysis to determine the extent of the relationship between the
utility's activities and the state. The Court noted that "the inquiry
must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state
itself." 110 The Court found that the utility was not operating
under the color of state law after examining such factors as the
utility's monopoly status, 111 its function of providing an essential
public service, 112 and the degree to which the relationship
between the utility and the state could be characterized as
"symbiotic." 113
106. Glendora, 162 Misc. 2d at 171, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
107. Id. at 173, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
108. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
109. Id. at 350. "The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation
does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. The Court emphasized:
Doctors, optometrists, lawyers, Metropolitan, and Nebbia's upstate
New York grocery selling a quart of milk are all in regulated
businesses, providing arguably essential goods and services, 'affected
with a public interest.' We do not believe that such a status converts
their every action, absent more, into that of the State's.
Id. at 354 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 351.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 352.
113. Id. at 357.
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